Emily McGill ABSTRACT: Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims …
Read More »Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity (pages 211-228)
Hili Razinsky ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character …
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Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences